Universalization of slave morality doesn’t preclude Nietzschean greatness

Final Paper for Nineteenth Century European Philosophy course

In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche distinguishes between master and slave morality and critiques slave morality on two key fronts. First, he argues that slave morality is intrinsically flawed due to its origin in resentment. Second, he objects to the universalization of slave morality, claiming it undermines the growth of strong individuals or higher men. In this paper, I begin by outlining the distinctions between master and slave morality. I then critically examine Nietzsche’s critiques of slave morality and argue that his objection to its universalization is unfounded, as it does not necessarily hinder the emergence or flourishing of Nietzschean higher men.

Nietzsche distinguishes between master and slave morality as a distinction that emerges from the understanding of good, bad, and evil (Beyond Good and Evil 154). This distinction emerges from the historical and psychological conditions of those who create values. In master morality, the distinction comes into the picture from the understanding of what being good implies. In such a framework: being good is related to being noble — having qualities like strength, the power to determine and create value, and honor themself (154). Being bad is not a moral condemnation but simply the absence of these noble qualities; it is associated with being cowardly, apprehensive, and petty (154). On the other hand, a different lineage leads to the understanding of slave morality. In slave morality, when people who were oppressed and weak get the helm of power for setting a moral framework, they start with evil, evil here denoting all the characters the powerful earlier had. The slave’s gaze, Nietzsche says, resents the virtues of the powerful (155). The good is then defined in terms of what is not evil. The good, in this framework, glorifies the existence of suffering people; it involves pity, patience, humility (156). Under the framework of slave morality, a good person has a non-threatening quality, is gullible, and is often easy to deceive (156). Nietzsche makes an attempt throughout his essays to clarify that while master morality is fundamentally based on the understanding of good, slave morality is fundamentally based on resentment towards what is good under master morality, and reframing such characters as evil.

Let us now discuss why Nietzsche’s philosophy might prefer one framework over the other. Why does Nietzsche think noble men/higher men are the men who have qualities ascribed good by master morality? One of the reasons is that Nietzsche believes in the power of an individual. He believes that each individual has the power to create, and determine values (154). He often talks about herd instinct — conformity to societal norms — as a pathology that must be overcome by strong individuals. He believes that society can be led forward and beyond by self-mastery, and the strength of the will of an individual. Master morality, as a framework, is focused on individuals. The idea of good emerges as a virtue of an individual with respect to themselves. In master morality, you are good if you overcome your weaknesses, and master your fate — you do not need anybody’s approval, and you hold yourself able to give honor to things as the creator of values (154).

Let us now turn to slave morality. Nietzsche critiques slave morality on two fronts: first based on its intrinsic character and second, on its consequences for individuals (‘noble men’) who embody strength and creativity.

In the first class of arguments, Nietzsche argues that slave morality is disdainful because it originates from ressentiment (resentment) of the powerful. Unlike master morality that grows out of individual growth, and the will to power — thus representing life, slave morality condemns human life by opposing power. Nietzsche calls slave morality “a pessimistic suspicion of the whole condition of humanity” (155). One can also extrapolate from Nietzsche’s arguments that he presumes slave morality to be hypocritical in origin. While slave morality preaches love, and humility, its root is hatred and envy towards the masters (the powerful). As a culmination of these arguments, Nietzsche goes as far as to say that slave morality is anti-life, it is “a will to negate life” (153). For Nietzsche, slave morality prohibits self-growth, which Nietzsche thinks is the direct manifestation of his idea of “will to power” — the fundamental principle which guides life. For Nietzsche, life is a constant struggle for power, but slave morality by origin is a resentment against power, and is at odds with the very existence of power and thus life. Nietzsche in the same vein, argues that suffering is necessary for growth and cultivation of excellence. He argues that profound suffering is necessary for nobility, and yet he scorns at how slave morality glorifies weakness. Polemic as he is, he says that Christianity, which he considers to be the origin of the inversion from master morality to slave morality as “la religion de la souffrance humaine” (the religion of suffering) (22). Consequently, he critiques slave morality of being too focused on abolishing suffering rather than using it as a tool for growth, and strength (41). I would like to present a last interpretation of Nietzsche’s argument for this class of arguments: Slave morality is focused on removing suffering, and removing the struggle of power, and in an ideal world, where such suffering/struggle is no more, there is no morality. Slave morality is then a reactionary framework of morality, and its origin is based on “abolishment” or “denial”. Slave morality survives as long as its resentment survives. This is in stark contrast to master morality which in an ideal world would lead to growth of all individuals, higher, noble men who master themselves, and preserve life through “will to power”.

On the second front, Nietzsche argues against slave morality because of its consequences on the higher men. He believes that the universalization of slave morality has negative consequences for noble men. One of the reasons for his claim is that the slave morality declares itself to be the ultimate truth, and does not allow any other way of living [“I am morality itself, and nothing else is moral”] (90). Slave morality, through this disguise as ultimate truth, forces individuals to conform to the herd. However, for Nietzsche, moral values are relative, and should not be applied universally. Relative here means that different people might need a different moral framework according to their strength. He concedes that slave morality might serve the needs of the herd. As slave morality is a morality of utility, Nietzsche argues that under right conditions, for example when all individuals have similar force and quantities of value, some aspects of slave morality (refraining from injuries, placing your will on par with others, etc) can be good manners (152). This means that he does not completely want to abolish slave morality. However, he has a problem with universalization of slave morality. For Nietzsche, slave morality is not suitable for higher men. For higher men, it impedes their will to power, and leads to their decay and disintegration (153).

Having explored Nietzsche’s distinction between master and slave morality, as well as his critiques on both intrinsic and consequential grounds, it is important to assess the validity of these arguments. While his condemnation of slave morality as being rooted in ressentiment offers a provocative critique of foundations of slave morality, his broader objection to the universalization of slave morality — through the alleged suppression of higher men — warrants a closer scrutiny. Can a moral framework truly inhibit the emergence of exceptional individuals, or does Nietzsche underestimate the resilience of higher men and their capacity to flourish even within a society shaped by slave morality? The following sections will critically engage with this aspect of Nietzsche’s critique, challenging his assumptions about universality and its impact on individuality and growth.

Let us now delve deeper into the nature of slave morality. Slave morality prohibits harming other people through its principles of love, pity, humility and patience. It is a system of placing your will on par with others (152). However, it does not prevent the highest minds from experiencing suffering themselves. As most of the virtues in slave morality are placed on reducing suffering of other people, it still leaves a room for those who seek challenges to flourish through self-imposed challenges. Pity, helpfulness, obliging hand, the warm heart, etc (156) while encouraging people to be second-person centric unlike master morality which is predominantly first-person centric, it is still compatible with struggles, and self-mastery. In the modern world today — most of which Nietzsche might argue as being a form of slave morality — especially egalitarian ideals and democracy as form of governance — people still encounter hardships today. People in such today’s world still practice what Nietzsche would call self-overcoming. People voluntarily embrace challenges, and foster growth and creativity in the process. For example, athletes in the modern world train themselves enduring extreme physical and mental effort, and use suffering to build resilience; academicians go through rigorous mental effort to get their doctoral degree, and become an expert in their field, all without necessarily negating the aspects of slave morality like pity, helpfulness, love, patience and humility. Therefore, greatness through suffering is not incompatible with a society where slave morality has been universalized. More precisely, slave morality focuses on reducing external suffering caused by others (e.g., oppression and harm), but it does not negate internal struggles. In Christianity, and Buddhism, for example, which Nietzsche generally associated with slave morality, often involve internal struggles like asceticism, and fasting to achieve higher states of being. While will to power through external means(through, say, violence or exploitation) might be denied, slave morality still allows will to power through constantly becoming better through self overcoming.

Clearly, there can be a few counter objections to this point. One of the counterarguments could be the following: Even though a world with slave morality is compatible for individual self-overcoming, it is not likely to be conducive for higher men. The universal narrative of “Suffering is bad” can cause people of potential to fall into despair and self-pity, leading them to completely self abandon their potential for greatness. During the times of adversaries, these people with potential, because they are so used to the narrative of suffering needing to be abolished, might choose to run away rather than face it.

A response to such an objection would be as follows: Nietzsche argues that higher men need an adversary to grow and achieve greatness. He states that the likelihood to be destroyed in the struggle for noble men must be enormously high (168). I argue that the universal narrative stated earlier — “Suffering is bad”, and it leading to “herd mentality” — in itself could be such an adversary. For example, an artist in a world that devalues suffering must overcome this narrative and transform suffering into creative greatness. This is in line with his idea of self-overcoming, where the highest type continually strives to surpass itself (33). Paradoxically, slave morality can serve as a tool for higher men to achieve greatness by challenging and transcending its limitations. As he himself stated in an aphorism, “What doesn’t destroy me, makes me stronger” ([Twilight of the Idols ‘Maxims and Arrows’ 8).]{.mark}

I can anticipate a potential pushback to this response. The pushback might take the form of the following argument: Even the strongest and highest individuals require a conducive environment for growth, and slave morality does not offer the necessary challenge for greatness. In fact, it acts destructively against such greatness. Rather than providing supportive backdrop, slave morality, from this perspective, becomes an obstacle. This raises a crucial tension: Does a world shaped by slave morality provide destructive challenges hindering their greatness? Or does it merely make their emergence more difficult, thereby intensifying their struggle and ultimately strengthening their greatness?

My response to such pushback would closely align with a core Nietzschean idea: for Nietzsche, greatness is not given freely --- it is achieved through struggle and self-overcoming. On one hand, one of Nietzsche’s ideals for higher men is creativity (Beyond Good and Evil 106). On the other hand, he believes that greatness arises not because of any specific moral code, but because one is alive, and life itself is the will to power (153). Greatness and power are forces that can operate within and against any order. Is it not the responsibility of the higher man to be creative enough to claim honor and turn the destructive force of societal conformity into power (through the creative exercise of will to power)?At the risk of being overly rhetorical: What is creativity, if not a way to navigate the thorns of the world without bleeding to death? For men who claim to be higher men, yet lament about the thorns of the world hindering their growth due to an unconducive environment---Nietzsche would suggest that while they might possess the potential for strength and struggle, they are not yet creative enough to overcome these challenges. By extension, they are not truly higher men. To create and determine your own values, and to hold yourself accountable for giving honor to things, requires more than just strength---it requires creativity. Therefore, I argue that slave morality does not hinder the emergence of higher men; rather, it makes their emergence more difficult. In doing so, it intensifies their struggle and, ultimately, strengthens their greatness.

To summarize, Nietzsche’s view that the universalization of slave morality hinders the growth of potential higher men can be critically challenged. It can be argued that it paradoxically acts as an adversary necessary for cultivation and flourishing of higher men. I argue that overcoming herd mentality, and pushback from slave morality, can provide a way to refine strength, and creativity for higher men, ultimately leading to Nietzschean greatness — right from within the framework of universal slave morality. In today’s world, this interpretation can help us understand the tension between contemporary egalitarian values and individual growth: the true measure of today’s higher man is in the creativity and strength of transforming societal constraints for individual growth and self-overcoming.

Bibliography:

Nietzsche, Friedrich. Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future. Edited by Rolf-Peter Horstmann and Judith Norman, translated by Judith Norman, Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. Twilight of the Idols. Translated by R.J. Hollingdale, Penguin Classics, 1990.